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Note
Federal Tort Claims Act: Notice
of Claim Requirement
L INTRODUCTION
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)l represents a sub-
stantial congressional waiver of the sovereign immunity2 of the
United States.3 The FICA states that "the United States shall
be liable... [in tort] in the same manner and to the same ex-
tent as a private individual under like circumstances."4 Under
the FTCA, a claimant must present a claim to the appropriate
agency5 within two years of the accrual of the claim.6 If the
1. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976).
2. Under English common law, the doctrine of sovereign immunity was a
bar to suit against the king. Blackstone's statement that "the king can do no
wrong" was based upon the special position held by the king, as supreme sov-
ereign. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMM:ENTARIES *239, 241-42. The king's personal pre-
rogative was accepted, without apparent reason, as part of the common law and
applied to the United States government in the early decision of Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821). See W. PxossER, LAw OF TORTS 971
(4th ed. 1971). See generally Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 AD. L
REv. 383, 384 (1970) (sovereign immunity described as a product of "accident,
habit... and inertia"); Comment, Sovereign Immunity: A Modern Rationale
in Light of the 1976 Amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act 1981
DuKE L.J. 116, 119-21 (modern rationales for sovereign immunity are that it re-
flects governmental balance of power and protects government actions from un-
due judicial interference). As a result of this doctrine, a victim of a government
tort was required to petition Congress to pass a private relief bill to receive
compensation. As the size of the government increased, so did the number of
government torts, leading to a greater number of petitions for relief. Dissatis-
faction with this procedure forced legislators to look for alternative ways to
deal with the problem. 1 L. JAYSON, HANDLinG FEDERAL TORT CLAins 2-6 (1982).
3. Other examples of the elimination of sovereign immunity are the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976); Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1345(f), 1402(d), 2409(a) (1976); Tucker Act of 1875, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491
(1976).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). The Act provides, however, that the United
States shall not "be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive dam-
ages." Id.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976) provides in part-
(a) An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the
United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or per-
sonal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first
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claim is denied or not finally disposed of within six months,
then a tort action may be instituted against the government.7
This notice requirement attempts to promote efficiency in set-
tling claims, reduce court congestion, and provide for fair and
equitable treatment of all claimants.
Because these objectives are not always compatible, courts
disagree over the requirements of proper notice. Most federal
courts have held that compliance with the notice of claim provi-
sion is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.8 The effect of the
Justice Department regulations 9 on this notice requirement is
presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim
shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by cer-
tified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final disposi-
tion of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of
the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim
for purposes of this section....
(b) Action under this section shall not be instituted for any sum
in excess of the amount of the claim presented to the federal agency,
except where the increased amount is based upon newly discovered
evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of presenting the
claim to the federal agency, or upon allegation and proof of intervening
facts, relating to the amount of the claim.
See generally Annot, 13 A.L.R. FED. 762 (1972) (construction and application of
FTCA and associated regulations to claim procedure).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976) provides in relevant part: "A tort claim
against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writ-
ing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues
... ." In United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122-23 (1979), the Court held
that a claim accrues when a claimant learns of the existence and cause of the
injury, and not when he subsequently learns that negligence may be involved.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976). See supra note 5.
8. Courts generally have held that the notice of claim requirement is ju-
risdictional in nature and cannot be waived. See Hubbert v. United States Pa-
role Comm'n, 585 F.2d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 1978); Blain v. United States, 552 F.2d
289, 291 (9th Cir. 1977); Allen v. United States, 517 F.2d 1328, 1329 (6th Cir. 1975);
Haynes v. United States, No. 81-2341 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 1981) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); Knouff v. United States, 74 F.R.D. 555, 557 (D. Pa.
1977).
While statutes of limitation are often subject to waiver or estoppel
[a] statute which in itself creates a new liability, gives an action to en-
force it unknown to the common law, and fixes the time within which
that action may be commenced, is not a statute of limitations. It is a
statute of creation, and the commencement of the action within the
time it fixes is an indispensable condition of the liability and of the ac-
tion which it permits .... [S]uch a provision is in other words juris-
dictional rather than a mere statute of limitations.
Simon v. United States, 244 F.2d 703, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1957).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1976) provides in relevant part:
The head of each Federal agency or his designee, in accordance with
regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, may consider, ascer-
tain, adjust, determine, compromise, and settle any claim for money
damages against the United States for injury or loss of property or per-
sonal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion of any employee of the agency while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if
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unclear, presenting a "pitfall for the practitioner."o Some
courts have required claimants to comply literally with all
agency regulations when presenting notice of a claim,"' al-
a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred:
Provided, That any award, compromise or settlement in excess of
$25,000 shall be effected only with the prior written approval of the At-
torney General or his designee ....
Pursuant to section 2672, the Justice Department has promulgated regula-
tions governing the procedures by which agency heads may consider and settle
tort claims. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.1-.11 (1981). The regulations provide, inter alia:
§ 14.2 Administrative claim: when presented.
(a) For purposes of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 2401(b) and 2672, a
claim shall be deemed to have been presented when a Federal agency
receives from a claimant, his duly authorized agent or legal representa-
tive, an executed Standard Form 95 or other written notification of an
incident, accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain
for injury to or loss of property, personal injury, or death alleged to
have occurred by reason of the incident.
(b) (1) A claim shall be presented to the Federal agency whose
activities gave rise to the claim.
Id. § 14.2.
§ 14.3 Administrative claim: who may file.
(a) A claim for injury to or loss of property may be presented by
the owner of the property, his duly authorized agent or legal
representative....
(e) A claim presented by an agent or legal representative shall be
presented in the name of the claimant, be signed by the agent or legal
representative, show the title or legal capacity of the person signing,
and be accompanied by evidence of his authority to present a claim on
behalf of the claimant as agent, executor, administrator, parent, guard-
ian, or other representative.
Id. § 14.3.
§ 14.4 Administrative claims: evidence and information to be
submitted.
(a) Death. In support of a claim based on death, the claimant
may be required to submit the following evidence or information:
(3) Full names, addresses, birth dates, kinship, and marital
status of the decedent's survivors, including identification of those sur-
vivors who were dependent for support upon the decedent at the time
of his death.
... (6) Itemized bills for medical and burial expenses incurred
by reason of the incident causing death, or itemized receipts of pay-
ment for such expenses.
(b) Personal injury. In support of a claim for personal injury, in-
cluding pain and suffering, the claimant may be required to submit the
following evidence or information:(1) A written report by his attending physician or dentist set-
ting forth the nature and extent of the injury, nature and extent of
treatment, any degree of temporary or permanent disability, the prog-
nosis, period of hospitalization, and any diminished earning capacity.
Id. § 14.4.
10. Corboy, Shielding the Plaintifffs Achilles' Heel: Tort Claim Notices to
Governmental Entities, 28 DE PAut L. REV. 609, 638 (1979).
11. See, e.g., Swift v. United States, 614 F.2d 812, 814 (1st Cir. 1980) (failure
1982]
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though occasionally courts have modified this demand when an
especially harsh result would occur.12 Other courts have held
that the regulations are not applicable to the presentation of
claims.13 These inconsistent interpretations of the notice re-
quirement create considerable uncertainty for claimants at-
tempting to recover under the FTCA.
This Note examines the legislative history of the notice of
claim provision and attempts to discern the policies Congress
sought to implement through use of the notice requirement.
The Note then reviews representative judicial decisions illus-
trating the range of positions taken by the federal courts when
construing the notice requirement. The Note concludes that a
"sufficient notice" approach is more consistent with congres-
sional intent, and suggests a list of factors courts should use to
determine whether notice is sufficient in a particular case.
IH. STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATIONS
As originally enacted, the FTCA waived the government's
immunity from suit for torts committed by a government em-
ployee "acting within the scope of [his or her office or] employ-
ment.' 4 Although the Act represents governmental
acceptance of responsibility for its torts,15 it also was intended
to provide documentation pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 14.4); Caidin v. United States,
564 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1977) (failure to state capacity of claimant to file for
injured party pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 14.3); Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d
1047, 1049 (3d Cir. 1971) (failure to claim money damages in sum certain as re-
quired by 28 C.F.R. § 14.2); Haynes v. United States, No. 81-2341 (N.D. IlM. Oct. 2,
1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist ifie) (failure to file medical
records under 28 C.F.R. § 14.4(b)). See infra notes 35-57 and accompanying
text. See also Annot., 13 A.L.R. FED. 762 (1972).
12. See, e.g., House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 573 F.2d 609, 618 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978) (government would not be prejudiced);
Santos v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 982, 985 (D.P.R. 1981) (to avoid dismissal
of widow's claim). See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
13. These courts have applied the regulations only to the settlement of
claims. See, e.g., Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 1982); Tucker
v. United States, 676 F.2d 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1982); Erxleben v. United States, 668
F.2d 268, 273 (7th Cir. 1981); Douglas v. United States, 658 F.2d 445, 447-48 (6th
Cir. 1981); Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 290, reh'g denied, 622 F.2d 197
(5th Cir. 1980); Reynoso v. United States, 537 F. Supp. 978, 979 (N.D. Cal. 1982);
Hoaglan v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (N.D. Iowa 1981). See infra
notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976). See supra note 5.
15. Absent a historical analysis, the limitations established by the no-
tice statutes would appear to represent only an unwarranted attempt
by governmental entities to avoid responsibilities imposed by the com-
mon law on the remainder of society. Actually, the notice statutes
[Vol. 67:513
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to relieve Congress from the burden of private relief bills.16
The Act provided for administrative settlement of claims up to
$2500 in order to save "time and effort and expense" through
negotiation and compromise.17
In 1966 Congress followed the lead of many state legisla-
tures18 by amending the FTCA to require that a 61aimant pres-
emerged as one response to the assault on the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.
Corboy, supra note 10, at 611.
16. As the nation grew and the activities of the Government spread, in-
evitably the volume of claims against the Government rose sharply.
The doctrine of immunity, however, stood as an absolute bar to suit on
claims of every kind whether in contract, tort or otherwise. Because
the claimants could only seek relief through private legislation, it was
not long before petitions for relief became so numerous that Congress
found itself under an intense and time-consuming burden of attempt-
ing to adjudicate, to the detriment of its duty to legislate. And the in-
consistency as well as the practical difficulty of the legislative branch
acting in a judicial capacity over a multitude of miscellaneous matters
became the subject of a steady stream of grumbling, criticism, com-
ment, and debate among the legislators and others concerned which
was destined to continue until the enactment of the Federal Tort
Claims Act in 1946.
1 L JAYSON, supra note 2, at 2-6.
17. Id. The FTCA was later amended to give the agency head authority to
settle claims of up to $25,000. See infra note 27.
18. See E. McQunzN, THE LAw OF Mu'iciPAL ColuoRATioNs, § 53.163 (3d
ed. 1977) (listing 24 of the states which have imposed a notice requirement
before suit can be brought against the state or local government).
As a result of legislative and judicial decisions, some state courts have en-
forced administrative claim requirements less strictly. Some state legislatures
have expressly provided that strict compliance with the notice provision is not
required. A Wisconsin statute provides that notice of a claim against the gov-
ernment must be presented within 120 days of the event, but that "[f] ailure to
give requisite notice shall not bar action on the claim if the [government] had
actual notice of the claim and the claimant shows to the satisfaction of the
court that the delay.., has not been prejudicial to the defendant ... " Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 893.80(1) (a) (West Supp. 1981). See also CAu GOV'T CODE §§ 911.4,
911.6, 946.6 (West 1980) (claimant may petition for leave to present a late claim,
which shall be granted if claimant is a minor or lateness is due to mistake);
N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 50-e (McKinney 1977) (court may extend time to present
claim; extension should be granted when the agency had "essential facts" or
when claimant is incapacitated or an infant). Many state courts have refused
to demand literal compliance with such requirements, finding that a claim has
been properly filed when it "substantially complies" with the notice provision.
See, e.g., Brasher v. City of Birmingham, 341 So. 2d 137, 138 (Ala. 1976); Gal-
breath v. City of Indianapolis, 253 Ind. 472, 478, 255 N.E.2d 225, 228 (1970); Kos-
sack v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30, 32 (Minn. 1979). See generally Corboy, supra
note 10 (Illinois tort claim statutes); Note, Notice of Claim Under the Municipal
Tort Claim Act-The Watchdog With Plenty of Teeth, 23 DRAKE L. REv. 670
(1974) (Iowa tort claim statutes).
Notice of claim requirements have been challenged under both state and
federal equal protection clauses and recently, in a few states, have been found
unconstitutional See generally Note, Notice of Claim Provisions: An Equal
Protection Perspective, 60 COmNELL L. REV. 417 (1975). Notice provisions "have
the effect of arbitrarily dividing all tort-feasors into two classes of tort-feasors:
1982]
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ent notice of a claim before suing the government in court. The
Committee on the Judiciary noted the "numerous precedents
in statutes governing tort claims against municipalities,"19 and
quoted specifically from statutes of the District of Columbia 2O
and the state of Iowa.2 1 Drawing upon these acts, the FTCA no-
tice of claim requirement, section 2675, provides that "[a] n ac-
tion shall not be instituted upon a claim [in tort] against the
United States ... unless the claimant shall have first
presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his
claim shall have been finally denied."22 Congress intended this
notice requirement to "protect the [government] from the ex-
pense of needless litigation, give it an opportunity for investiga-
tion, and allow it to adjust differences and settle claims without
suit."2 3 Settlement of claims would occur by making it "possi-
ble for the claim first to be considered by the agency whose
(1) private tort-feasors to whom no notice of claim is owed and (2) governmen-
tal tort-feasors to whom notice is owed." Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 235, 510
P.2d 879, 882, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973). In addition, victims of torts by
the government are de facto under a shorter statute of limitations since failure
to file a claim bars any subsequent suit. Reich v. State Highway Dept., 386
Mich. 617, 623, 194 N.W.2d 700, 702 (1972). Under the deferential "rational rela-
tion" standard, sufficient justification can usually be found to uphold the notice
provision. In O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 237 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1977), how-
ever, the West Virginia Supreme Court found a 60-day notice of claim provision
unconstitutionah
We perceive no valid reason for requiring such notice to a municipality
while no notice need be given to a private tort-feasor. The latter can be
and often is larger and more -widely extended than our municipalities.
The stated reasons for requiring notice to a city, other than the protec-
tion of public coffers, apply equally to many private tort-feasors ....
237 S.E.2d at 508.
When a court requires that the claim provision have a more direct relation-
ship to the stated objectives, the government entity must come forth to meet
this increased burden. For example, after finding that the claim provision at is-
sue would not survive the rational relationship test, the Supreme Court of
Washington examined the notice of claim requirement closely under an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny and held that the statute was not substantially related
to the objective of protecting the government from undue litigation. Hunter v.
North Mason High School, 85 Wash. 2d 810, 819, 539 P.2d 845, 849 (1975). Under
this rationale, the statute should have gone further and distinguished between
small and large private tortfeasors, for the latter are in a position similar to the
government. Also, the objective of settling out of court is an objective of all tort
parties, and could not sustain the statute. Id. at 815-18, 539 P.2d at 848-50.
19. S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEws 2515, 2517.
20. Pub. L No. 86-654, § 2, 74 Stat. 519 (1960) (current version at D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-1213 (1981)).
21. Act of Mar. 26, 1965, ch. 79, 1965 G.A. § 13 (current version at IOWA CODE
ANN. § 25A.13 (West 1978)).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976). See supra note 5.
23. S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515, 2517 (quoting E. McQuILUN, upra note 18, § 53.153).
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employee's activity allegedly caused the damage. That agency
would have the best information concerning the activity which
gave rise to the claim."24 Thus, the notice requirement is cen-
tral to the goal of protecting the government from needless liti-
gation by enabling the agency to investigate the claim and
determine whether it ought to be contested or settled. The
agency could then initiate settlement of meritorious claims
without undue expense or time consuming litigation.
Although the 1966 amendments were intended to benefit
the government by increasing the settlement of claims and re-
ducing court congestion, they also were enacted for the benefit
of the claimant. The House Judiciary Committee reported that
"[the amendments] have the common purpose of providing for
more fair and equitable treatment of private individuals when
they deal with the Government."25 Because a large number of
tort claims are amenable to out of court settlement,26 a proce-
dure facilitating settlements saves time and expense to
litigants.
Once an agency has had an opportunity to investigate a
claim, the claimant and the agency can move toward potential
settlement of the claim.27 The agency is given statutory author-
ity to settle in section 2672, which states that "[tlhe head of
each Federal agency or his designee, in accordance with regula-
tions prescribed by the Attorney General, may... compromise
... and settle any [tort] claim for money damages against the
24. S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2519. Also, that agency would most likely be able to inves-
tigate the claim. Congress noted that-
As of the end of October, 1965, 81 percent of the tort suits then pending
against the Government arose out of the activities of only five agen-
cies-Defense, Post Office, Federal Aviation Agency, Interior, and the
Veterans' Administration. This concentration of tort claims has led to
the development in the agencies of substantial expertise in the
problems involved in tort litigation.
Id.
25. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2515-16.
26. The Committee noted that "in private practice where prelitigation set-
tlements are allowed, only 40 percent of claimants for personal injuries file suit
and of these cases, less than 10 percent reach trial and only 3 percent go to ver-
dict." Id. at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2517.
27. To further encourage settlement, Congress increased the agencies' au-
thority to settle claims from $2,500 to $25,000. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws.at 2518. The previous $2,500 limit on agency authority
to settle prohibited settlement in many cases "even if the agency [found] that
it [was] clearly liable." Id. at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 2517. Congress also provided claimant's attorney with an incentive to settle
by increasing recoverable attorney's fees to twenty percent of any settlement
award. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2520.
1982]
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United States." 28
The Justice Department has promulgated regulations gov-
erning the procedures by which the agency heads may settle
tort claims against the United States.29 Title 28 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 14.2, requires that the claim be in
writing, be signed and that there be a claim for damages in a
sum certain.30 Section 14.3 establishes who has standing to
present the claim on behalf of another, and requires that the
authority of one to act for another be shown by evidence ac-
companying the claim.3' Section 14.4 provides that a claimant
may be required to support a claim by producing certain infor-
mation upon an agency request, such as a list of survivors in a
claim based upon death, or a physician's report in a personal
injury claim.32 There has been disagreement in the federal
courts whether these provisions establish the requirements for
a proper presentation of a claim pursuant to section 2675 or
whether they only outline procedures for settlement negotia-
tions under section 2672.
IL JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE NOTICE
REQUIREMENT
Many courts have held that a claim has been properly
presented pursuant to section 267533 when the claimant has
complied with the applicable regulations.34 Other courts have
ruled that these regulations do not apply to section 2675, which
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1976).- Settlement for amounts over $25,000 requires
Attorney General approval. See supra note 9.
29. See supra note 9. Claimants must also comply with regulations
adopted by the specific agency alleged to be responsible for the tort. Such reg-
ulations include: 7 C.F. § 1.51-.52 (1982) (Agriculture); 32 C.F.R. § 842 (1980)
(Air Force); 22 C.F.R. § 604 (1981) (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency); 32
C.F.R. § 536 (1981) (Army); 33 C.F.R. § 25 (1981) (Coast Guard); 15 C.F.R. § 2
(1981) (Commerce); 32 C.F.R. § 1280 (1981) (Defense Logistics Agency); 34
C.F.R. § 35 (1981) (Education); 44 C.F.R. § 11.10-.19 (Emergency Management
Agency); 10 C.F.R. § 1014 (1981) (Energy); 40 C.F.R. § 10 (1981) (Environmental
Protection Agency); 45 C.F.R. § 35 (1981) (Health and Human Services); 24
C.F.R. § 17 (1981) (Housing and Urban Development); 43 C.F.R. § 22 (1981) (In-
terior); 29 C.F.R. § 15 (1981) (Labor); 14C.F.R. § 1261.1-.315 (1982) (NASA); 36
C.F.R. § 503 (1981) (National Gallery of Art); 10 C.F.R. § 14 (1981) (Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission); 22 C.F.R. § 304 (1981) (Peace Corps); 5 C.F.R. § 177 (1982)
(Personnel Management); 39 C.F.R. § 912 (1981) (Postal Service); 36 C.F.L § 530
(1981) (Smithsonian Institute); 22 C.F.R. § 31 (1981) (State); 31 C.F.R. § 3 (1981)
(Treasury).
30. 28 C.F.R § 14.2 (1980). See supra note 9.
31. 28 C.F.R. § 14.3 (1980). See supra note 9.
32. 28 C.F.R. § 14.4 (1980). See supra note 9.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976). See supra note 5.
34. See supra notes 9, 29.
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requires presentation of a claim, but only to section 2672, which
establishes the procedures to be followed in the settlement of
claims.
A. NOTICE REQUIREMENT INCORPORATES
ADNim STRATrvE REGULATIONS
In the majority of the early FTCA cases, courts held that
the administrative regulations define the requirements of a
properly presented claim under the notice requirement section
2675.35 Many of these cases dealt with the failure of a claimant
to specify a sum certain or to sign the claim, as required by sec-
tion 14.2 of the regulations. 36 Although section 14.2 defines the
requirements "[f]or purposes of the [settlement] provisions of
... [section] 2672,"37 these courts held that section 14.2 is also
applicable to the initial notice of claim under section 2675.
In Bialowas v. United States,3 8 for example, the court dis-
missed a suit when the plaintiff asked for a "couple thousand
dollars, 3 9 instead of claiming damages in a sum certain. In de-
nying the claim, the court concluded that the "initial purpose of
the regulations requiring a statement of the specific sum
claimed is to enable a determination by the head of the federal
agency as to whether the claim falls within the [$25,000
limit]."40 Similarly, in Molinar v. United States,41 the claimant
presented various letters valued at $1,400, but did not total
them to attain a sum certain.4 2 The Molinar court suggested
another ground for applying section 14.2 to section 2675, reason-
35. See, e.g., Swift v. United States, 614 F.2d 812, 814 (1st Cir. 1980) (§ 14.4);
Caidin v. United States, 564 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1977) (§ 14.3); Bialowas v.
United States, 443 F.2d 1047, 1049 (3d Cir. 1971) (§ 14.2); Haynes v. United
States, No. 81-2341 (ND. Ill. Oct. 2, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist fie) (§ 14.2); Keene Corp. v. United States, No. 80-401 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (§ 14.2); Emch v. United
States, 474 F. Supp. 99, 103 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (§ 14.4); Kornbluth v. Savannah, 398
F. Supp. 1266, 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (34 C.FRL § 912.7(b)); Gunstream v. United
States, 307 F. Supp. 366, 368 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (§ 14.2). See generally Annot., 13
AJ.LR. FED. 762 (1972).
36. See, e.g., Bialowas v. United States, 443 F.2d 1047, 1049 (3d Cir. 1971).
See generally Annot., 13 A.L.R. FED. 762 (1972).
37. 28 C.F. § 14.2 (1981). See supra note 9.
38. 443 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1971).
.39. Id. at 1048.
40. Id. at 1050.
41. 515 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1975).
42. A problem occurs when a claimant does not state the claim in a sum
certain, but encloses various bills without a total. In this situation, a court
must decide whether to disregard the literal meaning of "sum certain" and total
the bills. Compare Bailey v. United States, 642 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 1981) (fu-
neral expenses and wage data not sum certain) with Molinar v. United States,
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ing that if "claim" as defined in section 2675 does not mean a
demand for a sum certain, then the prohibition of an ad
damnum clause in excess of the administrative claim would be
meaningless. 43 An ad damnum clause is prohibited in section
2675 which provides that an "[a]ction under this section shall
not be instituted for any sum in excess of the amount of the
claim."44 Thus, section 14.2 is applicable to make section 2675
internally consistent.
Once a court has read section 14.2 of the regulations as ap-
plicable to initial presentment of notice, the court must deter-
mine whether it will also require compliance with sections 14.3
and 14.4. Generally, courts have not "split" the regulations,45
but have held that all of the regulations govern initial presenta-
tion of the claim.46 Consequently, an injured claimant may be
required to present physician's statements 47 or, when filing a
claim for another, a statement showing the authority of the
claimant to file,48 in order to satisfy section 2675, the notice of
claim requirement. 49
Although under the early approach courts required claim-
ants to comply literally with the regulations, some courts al-
lowed exceptions to the rule on a case-by-case basis.5 0 These
515 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1975) (bills totalling $1,462.50 amount to a sum
certain).
43. 515 F.2d at 249.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (1976). See supra note 5.
45. In Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 288, 292, reh'g denied, 622 F.2d
197 (5th Cir. 1980), the court suggested, but did not hold, that § 14.2, but not
§ 14.3 or § 14.4, might be read as interpreting § 2675. See infra notes 58-67 and
accompanying text. The suggestion can be justified because both § 2675 and
§ 14.2 refer to the requirement that a specific sum be placed on the claim. Sec-
tion 2675 does not include within it, however, any reference to the terms of
§ 14.3 or § 14.4.
46. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 35. See infra notes 68-94 and accompa-
nying text.
47. 28 C.F.R. § 14.4 (1981). See supra note 9.
48. 28 C.F.R. § 14.3 (1981). See supra note 9.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976). See supra note 5.
50. See, e.g., House v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 573 F.2d 609, 618 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978) (court remands to determine whether at-
torney had power to file notice of claim for appellant when appellant failed to
sign the claim).
Our remand ... is not a strict application of 28 C.F.R. § 14.3(e), for
such would require us to dismiss their claims. We have softened its
vigor because these ... [claimants] present problems not previously
considered by this court and because ... any failure to comply was
not prejudicial to the government. This departure from the literal lan-
guage of the regulation does not indicate a willingness to treat the fail-
ure... [to comply] as merely technical defects. Such a failure, in the
absence of unusual and extenuating circumstances such as exist in this
case, deprives the court of jurisdiction to hear the suit.
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courts focused on the inequities that would result from dismis-
sal of the claim. For example, when a husband's administrative
claim in connection with the death of his wife failed to list sur-
viving children pursuant to section 14.3,51 the trial court re-
jected the government's motion to dismiss for failure to file a
proper claim.52 The court decided that "strict reliance on the
technicalities of the Regulations would work an injustice." 53
This result was common in cases which involved potential
prejudice to children.5 4 Other courts concluded that a claim-
ant's failure to comply with the regulations was simply too
technical a defect to warrant dismissal and emphasized the
lack of prejudice to the government because it had actual no-
tice of the claim.55 In one case, for example, excuse was given
when a partially subrogated insurer did not fie together with
the insured.56 In rejecting the government's motion for sum-
mary judgment, the court found that the filing by the insured
was sufficient for the insurer, and characterized the govern-
ment's argument as one standing upon "quicksand."5 7
B. NOTICE REQUIREMENT DOES NOT INCORPORATE
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
Under the approach adopted in Adams v. United States5 8
and Douglas v. United States, 59 section 2675 is satisfied when a
claimant gives the agency sufficient notice to allow it to conduct
an investigation.60 The regulations do not govern this initial
Id.
51. Young v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 736 (S.D. Ga. 1974).
52. Id. at 742.
53. Id. at 741.
54. See, e.g., Stokes v. United States, 444 F.2d 69, 70 (4th Cir. 1971); De
Groot v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 1178, 1180 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Locke v. United
States, 351 F. Supp. 185, 187 (D. Hawaii 1972). Cf. Estate of Santos v. United
States, 525 F. Supp. 982, 985 (D.P.R. 1981) (failure to properly list name of
widow on the claim excused as a mere technicality).
55. See, e.g., Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 508, 516
(6th Cir. 1974) (failure to list insurer, a real party in interest); Ozark Air Lines,
Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 63 F.R.D. 69, 72 (N.D. IlM. 1974) (lessee failed to list
name of lessor); Sky Harbor Air Service v. United States, 348 F. Supp. 594, 596
(D. Neb. 1972) (failure to list insurer, a real party in interest).
56. Sky Harbor Air Service v. United States, 348 F. Supp. 594 (D. Neb.
1972).
57. Id. at 595.
58. 615 F.2d 284, reh'g denied, 622 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1980).
59. 658 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1981).
60. See also Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1982); Tucker
v. United States, 676 F.2d 954, 956 (3d Cir. 1982); Erxleben v. United States, 668
F.2d 268, 271 (7th Cir. 1981); Crow v. United States, 631 F.2d 28, 30 (5th Cir.
1980); Speer v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 670, 674 (N.D. Tex. 1981), al'd, 675
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presentation. Once a claimant wishes to settle, however, he or
she must respond to agency requests for information as set out
in the regulations.
Adams and Douglas represent the growing number of deci-
sions holding that the regulations do not define proper notice
under section 2675 but apply only to the subsequent settlement
of claims pursuant to section 2672. In Adams, the claimants did
not provide physicians' reports and itemized expenses as re-
quested by the government pursuant to section 14.4(b).61 The
court found that by arguing for dismissal, the government con-
fused "the distinct functions of presenting notice and of engag-
ing in settlement."62 The court noted that Congress's purposes
were to provide for increased court efficiency and to treat
claimants in a more equitable manner, and concluded that the
two purposes are adequately served if the prerequisite admin-
istrative claim is filed to give "notice within a fixed time."63
Thus, the section 2675 notice requirement is satisfied "if the
claimant (1) gives the agency written notice of his or her claim
sufficient to enable the agency to investigate, and (2) places a
value on his or her claim."64
In Douglas v. United States,65 the claimant first informed
the government of his claim in 1971. After six years of exchang-
ing letters and shifting the claim from one agency to another,
the Navy finally denied the claim. The district court dismissed
Douglas's subsequent suit on the ground that he had failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. The district court stated
that Douglas had not provided the Navy with the information it
sought in addition to the notice of claim. The court of appeals
disagreed, finding that "[t] he controlling question in this case
is whether Douglas met the requirement of 'presenting' his
claim."66 The court held that the "regulations ... govern ad-
F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1982); Hoaglan v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (N.D.
Iowa 1981).
61. See supra note 9.
62. 615 F.2d at 288.
63. Id. at 289.
64. Id.
65. 658 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1981).
66. Id. at 447. The Douglas court attempted to harmonize Adams with the
decision in Swift v. United States, 614 F.2d 812 (1st Cir. 1980). The court read
Swif not as requiring compliance with the regulations in presenting a claim
under § 2675, but rather as holding that a claimant could not file a suit six
months after presenting a claim when the inability of the agency to evaluate
the claim within the six month period was caused by the claimant's improper
notice. This distinction makes no sense, however, since in Suft the claimant
had failed to comply with § 14.4. Adas explicitly held that the regulations
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ministrative settlement proceedings; they do not set federal ju-
risdictional prerequisites." 67 By failing to supply the agency
with additional information, Douglas only lost his opportunity
to settle out of court.
IV. NOTICE CONSISTENT WITH PURPOSES OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM SHOULD BE
SUFFICIENT
A. THE EARLY APPROACH
Although the early approach promotes administrative effi-
ciency by providing certainty in the requirements for a proper
notice of claim, Congress did not intend that the Act promote
efficiency to the exclusion of equity.68 In addition, the early ap-
proach may not provide for governmental efficiency to the same
extent as an alternative approach which considers both con-
gressional purposes. Application of the strict rule, along with
the occasional exceptions recognized by courts, 69 may involve
the judiciary to a greater, more burdensome extent than a more
unified, flexible approach.
The older position of the courts that a claimant must com-
ply literally with all the regulations in presenting a claim is in-
consistent with the equitable purposes sought by Congress.
Requiring literal compliance often results in the dismissal of a
claim on technicalities.70 Such a result is contrary to the Act's
expressed "purpose of providing for more fair and equitable
treatment of . .. claimants."7' Some of the information re-
were not applicable to § 2675 notice. 615 F.2d at 288. Nbtwithstanding this ques-
tionable distinction, the Douglas court adopted the Adams position that a
claim is presented within § 2675 when the claimant gives the agency notice suf-
ficient to allow investigation and places a value on the claim. 658 F.2d at 447.
67. 658 F.2d at 448.
68. See upra notes 35-49 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 642 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 1981) (claim
filed three weeks late); Robbins v. United States, 624 F.2d 971, 972 (10th Cir.
1980) (minority of claimant will not toll statute of limitations); Smith v. United
States, 588 F.2d 1209, 1211 (8th Cir. 1978) (same); Muldez v. United States, 326 F.
Supp. 692, 694 (E.D. Va. 1971) (agency fails to inform claimant of sum certain
requirement); Jackson v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 586, 587 (E.D.S.C. 1964)
(insanity will not toll statute of limitations). In addition to compliance with the
Justice Department Regulations, a claimant must comply with the regulations
promulgated by the various agencies. See supra note 29. See also Kornbluth v.
Savannah, 398 F. Supp. 1266, 1268 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (court notes that an agency
may require additional information beyond the Justice Department
regulations).
71. S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515, 2516.
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quired by the regulations may not even be available at the time
the claim must be presented. 72 Although an agency may pos-
sess sufficient information to investigate a claim, the failure of
a claimant to satisfy further agency demands would result in
dismissal of a subsequent suit. By requiring claimants to com-
ply with all the regulations, courts increase the burden placed
on a claimant attempting to file proper notice.7 3
Section 14.2 by its own terms does not apply to the present-
ment of a claim, but only "[flor purposes of the [settlement]
provisions of ... [section] 2672."74 The reasoning of Bi-
alowas7 5 and Molinar,76 in applying section 14.2 to present-
ment of a claim, is not sufficiently persuasive to overcome the
plain meaning of the regulation. The rationale of Bialowas,
that the statement of a sum certain is necessary to allow the
agency to determine whether or not it has authority to settle,
does not support dismissal of a claim for failure to state a sum
certain. A claim for a "couple thousand dollars" is clearly
within the settlement authority of an agency head. Even if the
sum demanded is not clearly within the agency's authority to
settle, such as a claim for "around $25,000," the agency is able
to and should conduct an initial investigation. Without the ini-
tial investigation, the agency may needlessly involve the Attor-
ney General's office at too early a stage in the claimant's action.
The agency can determine whether a claimant has a bona fide
claim for an amount outside the settlement authority of the
agency head.77 At the presentation stage, the $25,000 amount
should not always be considered critical,78 because the initial
72. E.g., total work-time lost due to the accident, required by § 14.4(b) (4).
See supra note 9.
73. ' The purpose of the [notice requirement is] not to make recovery from
the Government technically more difficult." Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v.
United States, 507 F.2d 508, 515 (6th Cir. 1974). "In promulgating section 2675,
Congress ... did not seek to allow federal agencies unilaterally to shift the
burden of investigation to private claimants while retaining only the responsi-
bility of evaluating the information supplied by the claimant." Adams v. United
States, 615 F.2d 284, 290 n.9 (5th Cir. 1980).
74. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (1981). See supra note 9.
75. 443 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1971). See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
76. 515 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1975). See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
77. The best approach would be for the agency head to seek authorization
from the Attorney General only after there are facts available to the agency
and a sum claimed. For example, if the facts as reported by an agency em-
ployee to the agency are not consistent with the amount of the damages
claimed, the Attorney General could decide whether the claim should be
granted or contested in court.
78. Even if the claim were for $1,000,000, an amount clearly outside the set-
tlement authority of the agency head, the agency may still begin an investiga-
tion into the claim, since the agency may be called upon to "prepare litigation
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request may be either exaggerated or above the amount for
which the claimant would ultimately settle. Thus, there is no
reason to read the sum certain requirement strictly. Moreover,
regulation 14.2 need not be incorporated into section 2675 to
make that section, which prohibits an ad damnum clause, inter-
nally consistent.7 9 The court in Molinar,80 which relied upon
this rationale, could have read section 2675 "as requiring by its
own terms" that a sum certain be claimed.8 ' Instead, in at-
tempting to make section 2675 consistent, the Molinar court
made the regulations inconsistent, applying section 14.2 to pre-
sentment of the claim when by its own terms it applies only
"[f] or purposes of [settlement]., 8 2
The reasons articulated in Bialowas and Molinar for apply-
ing section 14.2 to presentment, to give notice of claims requir-
ing Attorney General approval and to make section 2675
internally consistent, do not apply to sections 14.3 and 14.4.83
The rationale of courts that require compliance with these sec-
tions in presenting notice is to "permit a government agency to
evaluate and settle the claim at an early stage ... ."84 A func-
tional analysis of sections 14.3 and 14.4 indicates that compli-
ance with these requirements facilitates the settlement of
claims pursuant to section 2672, but not the presentment of
claims pursuant to section 2675. Section 14.3, for example, re-
quires that an agent prove his or her authority to settle a
claim8 5 so that the government can verify that the principal will
receive the benefits. Section 14.4 requires a statement showing
work time lost due to an accident 86 in order to provide for
prompt payment of damages and to avoid multiple claims.
Compliance with these provisions is not necessary when the
reports ... [and] suggest Government defenses to claims." S. REP. No. 1327,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515, 2519.
In addition, because such a claim may be settled after Attorney General ap-
proval, the agency would have to conduct an investigation anyway. See 28
U.S.C. § 2675 (1976), supra note 5.
79. Also, a far-sighted attorney, looking to the possibility of a court suit,
would request an exaggerated amount since the Act provides that the amount
of the claim sets the upper limit on the damages a claimant may later seek in
court See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (1976), supra note 5.
80. 515 F.2d at 248-49.
81. Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 291-92 n.15 (5th Cir. 1980) ("we
read section 2675 as requiring by its own terms that a claimant place a dollar
amount on his damages").
82. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (1981). See supra note 9.
83. 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.3, 14.4 (1981). See supra note 9.
84. Kornbluth v. Savannah, 398 F. Supp. 1266, 1268 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
85. 28 C.F.t § 14.3(e) (1981). See supra note 9.
86. 28 C.F.R § 14.4(b) (4) (1981). See supra note 9.
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agency is in the initial stages of investigation. Proof of agency
authority, or lost time at work by the claimant, does not assist
the agency in its initial investigation. Similarly, the list of sur-
vivors required by section 14.487 is of no use to the agency in
initially determining responsibility for a claimant's death.
Perhaps the reason some courts read the regulations into
the presentation of claims provision is their failure to distin-
guish between the two uses of the word "present." In the
broader sense, "present" within section 267588 is synonymous
with giving the agency notice to allow it to initially investigate
the claim.89 In defining the particulars of presentment in this
context, courts may have looked to the use of the word "pres-
ent" in section 14.2 of the regulations. This use of the word is
narrower, however, and only refers to the presentment of the
claim for purposes of settlement under section 2672.90 The fail-
ure of the courts to distinguish between these two uses of the
word '"present" led to the requirement that the initial notice
comply with the regulations.
The case-by-case exceptions9' made by some courts do not
go far enough in ameliorating the damage done by the require-
ment of technical compliance. These decisions do not profess
to adopt one rule, but are limited to their own facts.92 The re-
quirement that a claimant literally comply is still the general
rule. As a result, the burden is on the claimant to prove that
application of the general role to his or her situation is inequi-
table enough to warrant judicial exception. By providing for
case-by-case judicial exceptions to a strict rule, instead of
adopting a unified approach,93 the courts, inconsistent with the
legislative history, have subordinated the goal of equitable
treatment of claimants to government efficiency.94
87. 28 C.F.R. § 14.4(a) (4) (1981). See supra note 9.
88. See supra note 5.
89. Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1980). See also S.
REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2515, 2517-18 (Act requires "all claims to be presented to the appropriate
agency for consideration .... " (emphasis added)).
90. See supra note 9.
91.. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 508, 517
(6th Cir. 1974) ("Our decision rests to a large extent on the particular facts of
this case. Thus we intimate no opinion about the proper result in generally
similar situations not involving subrogation .... ."). See also supra note 50.
93. See infra notes 111-37 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
dual congressional purposes.
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B. THE SUFFICIENT NOTICE APPROACH
1. Consistent With Legislative History
The approach of Adams and Douglas, which requires a
claimant presenting a claim under section 2675 to give notice
"sufficient to enable the agency to investigate," more nearly
satisfies the dual legislative purposes of providing for the effi-
cient settlement of claims and the equitable treatment of claim-
ants.95 Any loss of efficiency in adopting the Adams-Douglas
approach is more than offset by the more equitable treatment
of claimants. Because it remains in a claimant's best interest
to settle out of court96 and to facilitate that settlement through
proper notice, loss of efficiency in settling claims will be mini-
mized. Allowing a claimant to forego compliance with the regu-
lations when presenting a claim would not impair agency
efficiency, because the requirements of the regulations do not
assist the initial investigation of claims.9 7 Especially in those
agencies in which there is substantial expertise in the
problems involved in tort litigation,9 8 the sufficient notice ap-
proach does not preclude an agency from efficiently investigat-
ing claims. In addition, if section 2675, as a jurisdictional
prerequisite, was intended to require more than minimal no-
tice, there would "be, inevitably, hearings on ancillary matters
of fact whenever the agency rejected a claim as incomplete."99
The distinction in Adams and Dpuglas between present-
ment and settlement promotes the second congressional pur-
pose "of providing for more fair and equitable treatment of...
claimant[s] when they deal with the government" 0 0 by remov-
ing the pitfalls which would result from requiring strict compli-
95. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
96. Assuming rationality on the part of the claimant, he or she would most
likely wish to settle. Indeed, Congress adopted the notice requirement to util-
ize the circumstances occurring in private suits. See supra note 26. Also, to
further encourage settlement in government suits, Congress provided for in-
creased attorney fees, bringing them "more nearly in line with those prevailing
in private practice." S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1966
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515, 2520. Gone is any incentive on the part of an
attorney to avoid settlement
97. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
98. 'Tort claims against the Government for the most part arise in connec-
tion with the activities of a few agencies. These agencies include the Post Of-
fice Department, the Defense .Department, the Veterans' Administration, the
Department of the Interior, and the Federal Aviation Agency. These agencies
therefore have a large degree, of experience in settling such claims." S. REP.
No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2515, 2517.
99. Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 1982).
100. Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 288 (5th Cir. 1980).
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ance with the settlement regulations.101 Under the early
approach, compliance with a particular regulation, in many in-
stances, will not contribute to an agency's ability to investigate
and therefore may be overlooked.102 In other situations, a
claimant may be aware of the regulation, but fail to comply lit-
erally; the claimant may simply be unaware that substantial
compliance will be inadequate. 0 3
The approach adopted by the Adams and Douglas courts is
also consistent with state court interpretations of the state and
municipal tort claims statutes which served as models for the
federal statute.104 Under state interpretations, the notice provi-
sion "is not intended... [to] be used as a sword to defeat the
rights of a person having a legitimate claim; its purpose is as a
shield ... against spurious claims."105 Under these statutes,
"substantial compliance ... is all that is required."106 The Ad-
ams-Douglas requirement that notice be "sufficient to enable
the agency to investigate" is consistent with the position taken
by the state courts.
2. The Problem of Specificity
Although the sufficient notice approach is more consistent
with the dual legislative objectives than the earlier approach,
some definition of what constitutes sufficient notice to allow an
agency to investigate a claim is required. 0 7 The approach
broadly suggests that a claimant (1) provide sufficient notice to
allow agency investigation, and (2) place a value on the claim.
The Adams and Douglas courts reached this result by focusing
101. One commentator has suggested that "attorneys accustomed to relying
on statutes for notice requirements might easily overlook the requirements of
the Code of Federal Regulations." Corboy, supra note 10, at 638. Attorney neg-
ligence, however, is not a ground for excusing noncompliance with the notice
requirements. See Bailey v. United States, 642 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 1981) (fail-
ure to file within two year period of § 2401). But cf. Segal v. Southern California
Rapid Transit Dist., 12 Cal. App. 3d 509, 512, 90 Cal. Rptr. 720, 722 (1970) (excuse
allowed under municipal tort claims act). See generally Annot., 55 A.L.R. 3d 930
(1974) (discussing attorney's mistake or neglect as excuse for failing to file
timely notice of tort claim against government unit).
102. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
103. This may occur since- substantial compliance has been adopted in
many state and municipal tort claim acts. See supra note 18.
104. See E. McQumLL, supra note 18, § 53.153.
105.- Id.
106. Id. § 53.163. The reliance by Congress on this treatise is set out in S.
REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2515, 2517.
107. '"The two congressional purposes are adequately served if the prerequi-
site administrative claim is only the giving of 'notice of an accident within a
fixed time."' Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d at 289.
[Vol. 67:513
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
on the legislative purposes of the notice of claim require-
ment.108 Without more specific definitions of these require-
ments, however, a large measure of uncertainty and
unpredictability will remain for agencies and claimants. Agen-
cies that face over five thousand claims per year'0 9 need to dis-
pose of the claims quickly by using their investigative expertise
efficiently." 0 An agency, having investigated a defectively
presented claim, must determine whether to continue to com-
mit its resources to investigation or to deny the claim. The for-
mer decision might result in wasted time. The latter decision,
because the courts may weigh the "legislative purposes" differ-
ently, might result in different treatment of similarly situated
claimants. Claimants, under the "legislative purposes" test,
will be uncertain of the notice they should give.
V. PROPOSAL: FACTORS IN PROPER NOTICE
Section 2675 requires that notice of claim be presented to
the appropriate agency and that the claimant may not sue
within the following six months."' During this six month pe-
riod, the agency has the opportunity to investigate the claim.n 2
The ability of the agency to investigate the claim is affected,
however, by the adequacy of the information contained in the
notice. Sufficient notice, therefore, should be defined in terms
of the investigatory function of the agency.
Generally, the agency's function upon receipt of a claim is
to ascertain whether the claim is spurious." 3 First, this in-
volves determining whether an agency employee acting within
the scope of his or her employment" 4 was responsible for the
occurrence described by the claimant. The agency needs
enough information to identify and question the employee and
any witnesses known to the claimant. Second, the agency must
be able to place a value on any possible liability. When sup-
108. Id. at 288.
109. "In 1965, the Post Office processed over 5,000 claims in the dollar range
of $100 to $2,500 and allowed 3,800 of them. Postal officials in the field allowed
another estimated 5,200 claims for less than $100. In addition, the Post Office
employees assisted the Justice Department in connection with the handling of
about 900 cases in Federal courts, cases... which involved alleged torts of pos-
tal employees." S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515, 2519.
110. Id.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976). See supra note 5.
112. S. REP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2515, 2518.
113. E. McQumuN, supra note 18, § 53.153.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976). See supra note 5.
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plied with information which allows it to assess fault and a rea-
sonable amount of damages, the agency can determine whether
to contest the claim or to enter into settlement pursuant to sec-
tion 2672.115
A. FACTORS IN PROPER NOTICE
Based upon the functions of the agency in investigating the
claim, courts should establish a list of factors to be considered
in deciding whether notice is sufficient. In order to give proper
weight to the equitable purpose of the notice of claim require-
ment,1 6 however, these factors should not be considered abso-
lute prerequisites to adequate presentment under section 2675.
First, the claimant should state the time and place of the
accident giving rise to the claim."'7 This requirement allows the
agency to determine which employee was involved. It also per-
nits the agency to independently investigate the scene of the
occurrence. Because this information is intended primarily to
lead the agency to the employee involved, in many circum-
stances minimal errors in description should be excused." 8
For example, in claims in which the tortfeasor is alleged to be a
"regular" employee of the agency, a day or even a week dis-
crepancy in describing the time of the alleged tortious conduct
should not be considered fatal. Because the "regular" em-
ployee could be expected to work during a specified shift, it
would make little difference whether the date specified was
incorrect." 9
Second, the claimant should provide any additional infor-
mation he or she has concerning the incident. The claimant
should describe the circumstances surrounding the event and
the manner in which it occurred.120 Such information will
serve as a basis from which the agency may question the em-
ployee alleged to be at fault.
Third, proper notice should set out a description of the
claimant's injury and the amount of damages sought. Section
2675, in prohibiting an ad damnum clause in excess of the
115. E. McQumU, supra note 18, § 53.163.
116. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
117. See E. McQunuN, supra note 18, §§ 53.166-.167.
118. Id.
119. A wholly erroneous description of the place, however, may be fatal, be-
cause each "regular" employee would only work regularly in a specified area.
The agency in such a situation would have the unwieldly burden of investigat-
ing nearly every employee engaged in a similar activity at the described time.
120. See E. McQuLInz, supra note 18, § 53.168.
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amount of the claim, requires that the claimant claim damages
in sum certain.121 This information is also important to the
agency in fulfilling its investigatory function. The agency will
compare the amount claimed with the circumstances of the in-
jury.122 Should the demand for damages be excessive in rela-
tion to the purported injury, the agency can decide to contest
the claim. In this situation, the agency may decide to contest
the claim even though it admits liability and would settle for a
lesser amount.
Fourth, section 2675 requires that the claim be presented
"to the appropriate Federal agency."'123 Failure to present the
claim to the appropriate agency should not be fatal,124 however,
when the initial presentation was made in good faith125 to an
agency within the two year statute of limitations.126 In this sit-
uation, the agency should either (1) transfer the claim to the
appropriate agency,127 or (2) return the claim to the claimant
with an explanation. If the initial presentment was made
within two years and the second presentment is outside of two
years, the burden should be on the agency to show that it was
prejudiced by the delayed claim. 28
Fifth, a factor which is required by the FTCA statute of lim-
itations 29 but is not necessary to the initial investigation, is the
requirement that the claim be in writing. Section 2675 does not
require that the claim be presented in writing.3o A writing re-
quirement, however, may tend to make the claimant more
aware of the solemnity of the process and thus guard against
spurious claims. In addition, a written claim protects both the
claimant and the agency against fraudulent changes in the
amount demanded in the claim.
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976). See supra note 5. See also supra notes 79-82
and accompanying text.
122. E. McQua=Ln, supra note 18, § 53.169.
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1976). See supra note 5.
124. See E. McQuamL, supra note 18, § 53.160 (noting that state courts are
divided on the question of whether the claim must be presented to the correct
agency).
125. The failure would be fatal, however, if it was presented to any agency
as a last minute attempt to compensate for a claimant's lack of diligence.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1976). See supra note 6.
127. This is required when a claim is presented for settlement purposes.
See 28 CY.FR. § 14.2(a), (b) (1) (1981), supra note 9.
128. A lack of prejudice suggests that the reason for requiring notice, to al-
low the agency to investigate, has been satisfied by the late claim. See supra
notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
129. 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1976). See supra note 6.
130. This section does require that any rejection of the claim by the agency
be in writing. See supra note 5.
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B. CONSTRUCTION OF THE FACTORS
In interpreting compliance with the five factors described
above, courts should bear in mind the purposes they serve: al-
lowing the agency (1) to determine whether an agency em-
ployee was responsible for the claimed injury, and (2) to
measure the acts of the employee against the claim for dam-
ages to determine whether to contest or settle. In addition, the
Congressional purposes of equity and efficiency should be con-
sidered when applying these factors. A claim which is only
substantially complete should suffice to meet the two year stat-
ute of limitations1 31 even though corrections may be needed to
allow complete agency investigation. A claimant, upon hearing
from an agency that there is a defect in the notice, i.e., that the
notice fails to comply with one of the five factors, should be al-
lowed a reasonable time to correct the deficiency. The amount
of time should generally be no more than thirty days, since in
most situations the information would be readily available to
the claimant. This "second chance" to correct a defective claim
will promote the equitable purposes of the notice require-
ment,132 while the short time of the extension will not greatly
delay agency investigation or increase the likelihood of fraudu-
lent claims.133 Failure to allow a second chance will only invite
unnecessary congestion in the courts with "factual hearings on
the threshold question of jurisdiction." 3 4
Finally, courts should consider adopting a good faith de-
fense to defectively presented notice. A claimant may in good
faith be unable to provide the information that would allow the
agency to investigate the claim.135 Allowing a good faith de-
fense is not contrary to the legislative purpose of promoting ef-
ficient disposition of claims through greater utilization of the
settlement process. The fact that Congress sought to en-
courage administrative settlement of claims does not mean that
every claim is amenable to pre-trial settlement. The claimant
with an adequate defense should be allowed to proceed to trial
and utilize the various discovery devices.136 This would be nec-
essary not only in the unlikely event that the agency was "sit-
ting on" valuable information,137 but also to question reluctant
131. 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1976). See supra note 6.
132. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanyinitext.
133. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
134. Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1982).
135. E. McQuLLN, supra note 18, § 53.161 n.10.
136. The FTCA makes no provision for pre-settlement discovery.
137. Because the FTCA makes no provision for discovery before presenta-
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or mobile witnesses.
VI. CONCLUSION
The various positions adopted by the federal courts on the
question of proper notice create uncertainty for claimants.
Strict compliance with the regulations does not permit a proper
balance between administrative efficiency and equitable treat-
ment of claimants. The issue of proper notification should be
decided with consideration given to the legislative history of
the FTCA. Claimants should be required to give the agency
sufficient notice to enable it to conduct an investigation of the
claim. The proposed five factors relating to sufficient notice are
premised on the inherent inability of a court or Congress to es-
tablish a strict yet equitable rule for all cases. Thus, courts
should adopt a purpose-oriented analysis of cases involving al-
leged defective notice of claim under the FTCA.
tion of a claim, an agency could possibly "sit on" information during the two
years the claimant has to present a proper claim. Section 3 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1977), which provides for easier access to
agency records, is not applicable to information given orally by government em-
ployees, from which an agency may gather most of its information. This prob-
lem of lack of pre-presentment discovery is discussed in Jacoby, The 98th
Congress and Government Litigation, 67 COLuM. L. REV. 1212, 1215-16 (1967).
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